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We explore how to measure poverty over time, by focusing on trajectories of poverty rather than 
poverty at a particular point in time. We consider welfare outcomes over a period in time, consisting of 
a number of spells. We offer a characterization of desirable properties for measuring poverty across 
these spells, as well as an explicit discussion of three issues. First, should there be scope for 
compensation so that a poor spell can be compensated for by a non-poor spell? Second, is there scope 
for discounting or should all spells be equally valued? Third, does the actual sequence of poor spells 
matter, for example whether they are consecutive or not? We offer a number of measures that 
implicitly offer different answers to these questions, in a world of certainty. Finally, we also offer an 
extension towards a forward-looking measure of vulnerability, defined as the threat of poverty over 
time, that incorporates risk. An application to data from Ethiopia shows that especially the assumption 
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1. Introduction 
 
A vast literature has developed on the measurement of poverty. Poverty is considered 
a state of deprivation, with a living standard below some minimal level. Much debate 
has focused on ways to approach the underlying standard of living. For example, in 
recent years much attention has been given to finding appropriate ways to address the 
multidimensionality in assessing living standards and poverty (Tsui 2002, 
Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). In this paper we focus on another issue often 
ignored in the standard poverty literature, that the standard of living is not a static, 
timeless state, but a state that evolves over time. The standard of living follows a 
trajectory, a path with a history and a future. As a consequence, to assess poverty over 
time for a particular individual or society, we could explore how we should assess 
different trajectories of the standard of living, rather than just focusing on the standard 
of living and poverty in each period, as if neither past nor future poverty experiences 
had any bearing on the meaning of present hardship. In this paper, we provide some 
tentative steps to address this issue. 
 
Both theory and empirical evidence provide reasons why careful attention to time 
paths may be important. If we are interested in wellbeing over a long time span, 
information about present outcomes can only be sufficient in a very stable world, 
where individuals need not exert any effort to ensure that their outcomes remain 
invariant. It is hard to think of such scenario. In practice, first, a myriad of reasons for 
fluctuations exist, and smoothing efforts are often impossible, e.g. in the case of 
health, which cannot be transferred from the present to the future, nor vice versa. 
While some storing technology may be available for other wellbeing dimensions, the 
individual may still find it hard to fully smooth away all variations, since such 
technology will rarely be perfect. For instance, in the case of consumption, credit 
market failures disallow some people to resort to high future consumption flows in the 
face of current hardship. Secondly, in a world with uncertainty, random shocks may 
push outcomes above or below the expected time-invariant target. If insurance 
mechanisms are imperfect, then the individual will be exposed to the consequences of 
shocks she failed to foresee. 
   3
In this paper, fluctuations are interesting in their own right. However, this does not 
mean that their long-term effects on living conditions are overlooked. Surely enough, 
fluctuations may turn into serious persistence: a temporary shortfall may translate in a 
long period of low wellbeing, with slow and uneven recovery, if at all. Also, in their 
quest for stability, households may react to the threat of fluctuations by resorting to 
smoothing efforts with some cost in terms of long-run growth. For instance, a street 
vendor may prefer not to commit to items exhibiting great seasonality, even if they are 
very profitable. 
  
The issues arising as soon as we pay attention to time trajectories are thus manifold. 
Policy implications also promptly crop up. For instance, this concern can be directly 
linked to policy discussion related to concepts of ￿chronic￿ poverty: we should be 
concerned with poverty that does not easily resolve itself, that has a persistence 
attached to it. Obviously, this is a statement about a future state, but not just about one 
future period, but related to a permanent escape or the lack of escape from poverty, 
persisting in different periods. In order to assess different paths over time, means of 
ordering and/or valuing these trajectories are required.   
 
This paper therefore explores issues related to the assessment of poverty over a 
lengthy period of time for an individual. By ￿lengthy￿ we mean that this period can be 
decomposed into spells. In each spell, we observe the level of the standard of living, 
which for simplicity we will call consumption. Each spell is long enough for 
consumption flows to be observed and measured. For instance, we may think of a 
five-year period, with consumption data for each single year. Let us use ￿spell￿ to 
refer to the time-units (indexed by t) where consumption flows ct are measured (in the 
example, one year), and ￿period￿ to refer to that ￿lengthy￿ stretch which we are 
interested in (i.e. all five years together). 
 
While for the sake of concreteness, in this note we prefer to speak of consumption, the 
discussion equally applies to any other dimension of well-being, such as nutritional 
status. Define poverty in a T-spell period as 
 
PT(y1,y2,￿,yT), 
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where yt stands for consumption at spell t. Let z be the poverty line. We assume this 
line to be time-invariant for simplicity. Alternatively, if poverty lines did vary over 
time, our analysis would still hold only if outcomes in every spell to be normalised 
with respect to their spell-specific poverty lines. Put it differently, in our setting, 
consumption changes over time must reflect variations in the ability of the individual 
to reach decent living standards, above the minimum acceptable norm. 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that the concerns addressed have no precedents. A vast 
empirical literature has developed that assesses the ￿dynamics￿ of poverty, by 
following the poverty status over time of particular individuals or groups. For 
example, Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) summarize a number of studies, using panel 
data, by counting ￿poverty spells￿, whereby they mean how often people are observed 
to be poor in a particular period, and also using simple concepts of poverty mobility, 
based on poverty transition matrices, identifying who moved in and out of poverty, 
and who stayed poor. The best-known summarizing measure of poverty assessed over 
time is Ravallion￿s ￿chronic poverty￿ measure. This measure assesses chronic poverty 
as the level of poverty obtained based on a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure, using 
the average level of consumption over the entire period as the underlying standard of 
living measure (Jalan and Ravallion, 2000).  
 
In this paper, we will argue that these approaches are particular, certainly suggestive, 
but still arbitrary choices among many different others that could be made to make 
sense of poverty over a particular period.
1 We will present a number of measures and 
document some of the specific underlying normative choices based on specific 
alternative axioms. Our approach may be best motivated by considering a few 
imaginary scenarios. First, let Figure 1a act as a benchmark description of 
consumption flows of a given individual. There, each poverty-free spell is succeeded 
by hardship, which in turn lasts for only one spell and is followed by a fresh episode 
of sufficient consumption. How should this scenario compare to those in the other 
three charts? In Figure 1b, the same pattern exists, except consumption is higher in 
non-poor spells, whereas poor episodes remain just as bad. Should we say that period-
                                                 
1 Some of the concerns explicitly considered in this paper related to compensation over time and 
discounting are also discussed in a very different context, related to adjusting poverty measures to 
handle differential mortality across a population in Kanbur and Mukherjee (2006).   5
long poverty has lessened? This raises the issue of compensation of poverty spells by 
non-poverty spells, and the first issue tackled below. As we will show, different 
plausible measures of poverty of time take a different stance on this issue. In static 
poverty measurement, across indivduals, the issue barely arises by using the focus 
axiom: the non-poor￿s outcomes are considered as if they just have reached the 
poverty line. When considering the poverty over time of a specific individual, this is 
not self-evidently resolved, as some may argue that hardship at some point in life may 
be acceptable if it is followed by much better outcomes in other periods. In our 
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Next, compare 1a with 1c. As seen from 2006, the salient difference lies now in the 
fact that poverty episodes were suffered further back in the past. The alternation 
pattern is otherwise still in place. The question is then whether the assessment of 
period-long poverty must pay the same attention and attach the same weight to all 
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isolated poverty spells, regardless of how far in the past each occurred. This may be 
the case if the affliction of human deprivation is seen as an irremediable loss, but on 
the other hand, its burden can also be imagined to die out as time passes. This is a 
second issue explicitly discussed: is there any case for using ￿discount rates￿, 
judgements on the relative importance of the present relative to the future or past? 
 
The same question arises as we lastly take Figure 1d. Keeping Figure 1a as the 
benchmark, 2002 and 2005 seem to swap consumption levels. However, a new issue 
comes forth, since poverty spells are now contiguous, and the individual faces a 
prolonged episode of poverty (2004-2006). Should the distress of hardship compound 
over time, such that three-spell episode of poverty should cause greater harm than 
three isolated poverty spells? This is the third question to tackle as we turn to our 
intent to propose poverty measures over a lengthy period. 
 
While these stylized examples show some of the choices involved, trajectories 
observed in actual data look more messy. For example, take four trajectories found in 
the Ethiopain rural household panel data survey, with six observations in the period 
1994 to 2004. While these consumption levels may well be measured with error, the 
patterns are not simple, and general judgements about how to order these in terms of 
poverty over time are not self-evident. For example, the household of Abebe (Figure 
2a) appears to have been going downhill in the last four years of the data, but has only 
one spell in poverty, while Alemu (Figure 2b) has four poverty spells, but by the end 
of the period has two years above the poverty line. Tigist and Asfaw￿s families 
(Figures 2c and 2d) both have spells below the poverty line, but at different times in 
the sequence 
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It is clear that many judgements will be required to summarize such trajectories of the 
standard of living in one single index of intertemporal poverty. This paper aims to 
present a number of possible indices, even though its main aim is to make some of 
these normative judgements explicit. 
 
Foster (2007) in this collection has a related objective, but aims to explicitly construct 
a class of measures of ￿chronic poverty￿. Below we will highlight the similarities with 
at least one of our own measures, but there is one crucial difference worth 
commenting on now. His measure starts from the identification within the data of who 
is chronically poor, and then proceed in ways not dissimilar to ours. In his paper, a 
￿chronic￿ poor person is someone who experiences at least a specific percentage of 
poverty over time. His measure of chronic poverty then values the depth and severity 
of poverty for such persons, excluding the non-chronically poor. While internally   8
fully consistent and sensible, and a chronic poverty equivalent of the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke measure, one key requirement is a judgement of a cut-off for classifying 
someone as ￿chronic￿ poor, irrespective of how far below the poverty line this person 
is. By introducing a further threshold beyond the poverty line, the result is that people 
with just over the required number of spells for chronic poverty, but with all spells 
just below the poverty line would be considered chronically poor, while someone with 
marginally fewer but more serious spells is counted as transitory poor. Our approach 
does not resolve this issue at all ￿ it just ducks it ￿ by considering measures of  ￿a poor 
life￿, or more precisely the extent, depth and severity of ￿poverty over a period of 
time￿, using a means of weighing all poverty spells in one aggregate across time, 
irrespective of the frequency of spells.  
 
In the next section, we offer the basic setup, discussing the key decision needed 
regarding applying a focus on poverty, transformation of outcomes and aggregation 
over time. In section 3, we present a number of core axioms that may guide these 
choices, and the resulting choice of measures. In section 4, a set of measures are 
presented, ordered by the particular sequence in terms of applying focus, 
transformation and aggregation. They can be shown to satisfy (or not) some of the 
suggested axioms for intertemporal poverty assessment. The rest of the paper will 
offer extensions. In section 5, a discussion is introduced on the role of time 
preference, while in section 6, the idea of a sensitivity to prolonged poverty is 
introduced. In section 7, we reintroduce risk and derive a forward-looking measure of 
the threat of long-term poverty, building on our previous work on vulnerability. 
Finally, in section 8, we offer some examples of how some of the measures may be 
applied using data from Ethiopia.  
 
2.   Basic Setup 
 
Unless otherwise stated, and for most of the paper, we will imagine the world to be 
uncertainty-free. All consumption levels are perfectly known, regardless of the point  
we take in time. For instance, as seen from the final spell, a backward-looking 
assessment of poverty througout the period has the benefit of hindsight, and no 
uncertainty clouds the view of past consumption levels. Our assumption intends to put   9
forward-looking assessments on a similar standing, by granting the individual the gift 
of perfect foresight. To see what this implies, imagine periods are seen (ex-post) from 
their final spells and ranked according to some intertemporal poverty measure, and 
also, that some ranking reshuffling occurs if the standing point is brought forward (ex-
ante) to their first spells. In our world, uncertainty cannot act as an explanation for 
such reshuffling, at least for now. In the final section of the paper, we will suggest an 
extension in which t his perfect foresight is dropped and uncertainty is reintroduced. 
 
By assuming away uncertainty, we can focus both ex-post and ex-ante analyses on our 
central question, which is to identify a metric for how much suffering or deprivation 
was or will be endured over a particular period. This concern must be distinguished 
from the current experience of suffering which may be caused by a grim future (a 
sense of hardship to come), or by unhappy memories of past deprivation. For 
instance, if we speak about poverty between 2007 and 2015, we will enquire how 
much poverty will be ￿accumulated￿ by the end of 2015 (and not how much future 
hardship impinges ex-ante on wellbeing in 2007). In this note, we think of period-
poverty as the cumulative result of spell-specific poverty episodes. 
 
In the vein of the distinction between ￿identification￿ and ￿aggregation￿ in the 
measurement of aggregate poverty (as in Sen), let us propose the following three 




It is well-known that all measures of aggregate poverty (e.g. Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke, 1984) build on some form of focus axiom, whereby outcomes above 
z are censored down to the poverty line itself, since the poverty of the poor is not 
meant to be alleviated by the richness of others. For instance, a society will not 
be said to be less poor simply because the rich become richer, with no change in 
consumption levels among the poor. Thus, it is this focus condition what 
￿identifies￿ the relevant outcomes. Let this stage be related to a function f(u), 
such that f(u)≡Min[u,zu], where zu is the relevant poverty threshold,  e.g. zu=z if 
y=u. 
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b) Transformation 
 
To motivate this stage, recall the well-known Pigou-Dalton condition, whereby 
aggregate poverty rises if consumption is transferred from the very poor to the 
not-so-poor. In our case, we may require period poverty PT to rise as a 
consequence of a transfer from a poor spell to a not-so-poor spell, in the 
presumption that the drop in the former will outweigh the gain in the latter. This 
however is a presumption that cannot be taken for granted in our case, since the 
locations in time of these two spells may matter and have not been determined 
yet. For instance, the poorer spell may have occurred such a long time ago, that 
its loss in consumption may be meaningless. The ￿aggregation￿ step turns to such 
issues shortly. 
 
Nonetheless, we can still say that for equally-valued spells (in the way that all 
individuals are equally valued by the Pigou-Dalton condition), a transfer for the 
benefit of a not-poor spell should result in greater intertemporal poverty PT. In 
practical terms, this implies that outcomes yt must at some point be transformed 
by a suitable strictly convex function, either before or after some correction for 
the value of their time location has been made. 
 
Let function g(u), with g′(u)<0 and g″(u)>0 account for the possibility of this 




Thirdly, spell-specific inputs must combine into one single measure of total, 
period-long poverty PT. To be clear, we deal here with an aggregation over time-
spells, and not over individuals (as in the usual poverty measures). Hence, 
aggregation methods may well differ from the standard procedure. For instance, 
they will need to account for weight differences across time spells, e.g. if we 
were to decide that spells further back in the past should be paid less attention 
than more recent ones. 
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Let function AT(u1,u2,￿,uT) perform this aggregation. To keep the convex, 
Pigou-Dalton-like transformation as a separate issue, let AT be linear in each of 
its arguments. This restriction has no major drawback ￿ except for the transfer 
argument described above, there is no obvious reason why changes in any spell 
should be allowed to have any bearing on the effect on PT of further changes in 
that same spell. 
 
How these three stages come together is a question with no unique answer. Will we 
first apply focus, then transform and then aggregate over the entire period, or will we 
change the order of these actions? As will be shown below, this sequence matters. But 
which order we choose will depend on our view on the set of desirable properties of a 
period-long poverty measure. To develop this further, we will in section 4 give 
examples of the possible permutations related to focus, transformation and 
aggregation. In the next section, we will first discuss some possible desiderata.  
 
3. Formalizing the axioms 
 
In this section, we offer a few possible axioms that can guide us in choosing particular 
measures of individual, period-long poverty. The set of these axioms is not 
exhaustive, in the sense that no combination of them determines uniquely a particular 
family of measures. These desiderata will nevertheless offer routes to decide among 
different permutations of focus, transformation and aggregation. 
 
The first two axioms are quite general and hardly debatable.  
 
Monotonicity in outcomes 
 
Since consumption rises can under no circumstances cause a rise in poverty, we 
impose 
 
 For  d>0, PT(y1,y2,￿,yt+d,￿,yT) ≤ PT(y1,y2,￿,yt,￿,yT) (1) 
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A narrower definition specification is only possible if we decide when the focus stage 
will enter. For instance, if the focus function f is allowed to come first, then we could 
go further and require 
 
 For  d>0 and yt<z, PT(y1,y2,￿,yt+d,￿,yT) < PT(y1,y2,￿,yt,￿,yT)  (1￿) 
 
In words, this alternative version imposes that a consumption rise during a poverty 
spell will reduce overall poverty. In (1), since focus has not yet been enforced, yt<z  is 
not enough to take for certain that the reduction in PT will occur, and we can only rule 
out a rise in poverty. 
 
Increasing cost of hardship 
 
This axiom echoes the Pigou-Dalton condition, whose exact translation to our setting 
would impose that a consumption transfer from a very-poor spell to a not-so-poor 
spell should raise overall poverty. However, we cannot readily resort to this 
formulation here, since the time location of these spells must also be specified, unless 
we assume that regardless of these locations, all spells are equally valued. While the 
Pigou-Dalton assumption that all individuals (with equal consumption) receive equal 
attention faces no major objection, here we must allow for the case where some time 
spells receive greater weight than others. 
 
An alternative formulation can build on the effect of consumption changes at one 
single spell, and thus steer clear of the risk of committing to valuations of changes in 
two different spells. The spirit of this condition remains unchanged ￿ consumption 
losses hit harder if consumption is already low to begin with. We may phrase it as the 
increasing cost of hardship. Formally, 
 
 For  d>0 and yK<z, PT(y1,￿,yK,￿,yT) ￿ PT(y1,￿,yK+d, ￿,yT) 
 >  PT(y1,￿,yK+d, ￿,yT) ￿ PT(y1,￿, yK+2d,￿,yT) (2) 
 
Next, one may invoke an axiom providing the basis for comparison across periods of 
different lengths. While ￿total￿ poverty over a given T-span is necessarily dependent 
on its length T, one may wish to speak of poverty at an ￿average￿ spell, i.e. the spell-  13
specific poverty level which, if repeated in every single spell of the period, would lead 
to the observed period-long poverty level. To formalize this, let PT(y1,y2,￿,yT) 











kT) = kPT(y1,y2,￿,yT), 
 where  y
′
 i+k(t￿1)=yt for t=1,2,￿,T and i=1,2,￿,k. (3) 
 
In (3), we imagine that the complete period is lengthened by allowing the first spell 
repeat k times before the outcome of the (initially) second spell obtains, which then 
repeats k times before the third outcome occurs, and so forth. Consider the following 
alternative formulation (3￿), where the whole period unfolds and is then followed by 









kT) = kPT(y1,y2,￿,yT), 
 where  y
′
t+k(i-1) =yt for t=1,2,￿,T and i=1,2,￿,k (3￿) 
 
The difference between (3) and (3￿) is trivial only if we impose two assumptions 
which we shall discuss further on, namely that all outcomes are equally valued, 
regardless of the time when they occur, and also that hardship is assessed in each spell 
separately, e.g. with no chance for the immediately preceding outcomes to matter. 
Otherwise, if either of these assumptions fails, then a choice between (3) and (3￿) is 
required. Both assumptions are also underlying the two remaining axioms of this 
section. 
 
Note that this axiom is clearly akin to the population invariance axiom of aggregate 
poverty measurement. It also plays a similar role here in contributing to a linear 
specification of the aggregation function AT. In the spirit of Foster and Shorrocks 
(1991), we will approach linearity by imposing this full-period repetitions axiom and 
also a ￿sub-period consistency￿ axiom. The latter is meant to impose Gorman 
separability and hence needs PT(y1,y2,￿,yT) to be a transform of a linear combination   14
of y1, y2, ￿, yT as long as T≥3. The axiom on full-period repetitions then generalises 
this result to T≥1. 
 
To formalize, and further mirroring the aggregate poverty literature, allow the period 
to be decomposed into (any) two sub-periods and  focus on the reaction of period-long 




  PT(y′1,y′2,￿,y′K,y′K+1,￿,y′T) > PT(y1,y2,￿,yK,yK+1,￿,yT) (4) 
 if    PK(y′1,y′2,￿,y′K) > PK(y1,y2,￿,yK) 
 and  PT￿K(y′K+1,y′K+2,￿,y′T) = PT￿K(yK+1,yK+2,￿,yT). 
 
If some sub-period exhibits a rise in poverty (while poverty remains unaltered in all 
other sub-periods), then PT must also rise for the entire period. This sensitivity is what 
we mean by ￿consistency￿. Its interpretation may gain from noting that it restricts the 
ability of some spells (those from K+1 to T) to impinge on the effect of other spells 
(from 1 to K) on PT. We may see the seed of a linear specification here, which 
however needs a stronger axiom to be fully imposed. Such axiom can be phrased as 
￿sub-period decomposability￿, whereby total period-poverty is a weighted sum of both 




  PT(y1,y2,￿,yK,yK+1,￿,yT) = 
T
K





Needless to say, this axiom is reminiscent of sub-group decomposability in the 
aggregate poverty literature. Again, note both that timing is assumed to have no 
bearing on the valuations of a given spell, and any information in the sequence of 
poverty spells can be ignored: the valuation of a poverty spell is unrelated to its 
history, such as whether the person was poor before or not ￿ sequences are quite 
freely broken into sub-pieces. 
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Even though this set of axioms is relatively limited, they are enough for a clarifying 
discussion on some possible measures, linked to particular permutations of the 




4. Choices as a matter of sequencing 
 
We said that alternative PT specifications follow from alternative sequencing choices 
for three crucial stages (Focus, Transformation and Aggregation). Even though six 
orderings thereof are possible (FTA, TFA, FAT, TAF, AFT and ATF), in this section 
we only consider four of them, prior to giving the general specification of the 
corresponding period-long poverty measures, as well as a number of specific 
examples. Four orderings are enough to characterise the existing alternatives, since it 
can be easily shown that focus and transformation can swap positions with no 
practical consequence, provided aggregation is not inserted between them. Thus, FTA 
exhausts all the insights in TFA, and likewise AFT can stand for ATF. 
 
Case 1: Focus-Transformation-Aggregation (FTA) 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () T T T T y f y f y f g A y y y P , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 K K ≡   (6) 
 
In this case, imposing first focus implies that consumption levels are immediately 
censored. Hence, this specification rules out compensations across time spells, in the 
same spirit of the focus axiom in aggregate poverty measures, which discards 
compensations across individuals. In our case, the intuition could be phrased as 
follows: ￿poverty episodes cause shock and distress to such an extent, that they leave 
an indelible mark ￿ no future or past richness episode can make up for them￿. 
 
Under FTA, convexity is imposed next, before aggregation. Unsurprisingly, the 
resulting families of measures are reminiscent of the well-known Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984), and Chakravarty (1983) measures of aggregate poverty. To see 
this, consider in particular the first two of the examples below, where ỹt≡Min[z,yt] and   16
aggregation allows for some time-adjustment, as by β
t. For now, and for the rest of 
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β K , with 0<α<1 and β>0. (8) 
 
Measure (7) is a simple multi-period version of the FGT measure, where aggregation 
has acted upon time spells, rather than individuals. (8) offers a similar idea for the 
Chakravarty measure. In terms of formal desiderata, FTA does rather well in 
capturing at least some of the basic desiderata.  Both Monotonicity and Increasing 
cost of hardship apply. Transformation ensures the latter because it applies before 
aggregation, i.e. before all spell-specific outcomes merge into some form of total 
consumption, where no distinction between poor and not-so-poor spells would be 
possible. Likewise, Sub-period decomposability is also possible due to the fact that 
aggregation comes last, so that the linearity of the final specification is not 
endangered  ￿ thus, total-period poverty can be written as a weighted average of sub-
period poverties. This equally allows Full-period repetitions. 
 
A limiting case of (7) is familiar, imposing β=1 and α=0. It would result in a period-
long poverty measure that simply counts the number of spells below the poverty line. 
But unlike (7), by imposing α=0, it would fail both the Monotonicity and the 
Increasing cost of hardship axioms. Nonetheless, the simplicity of this specification 
makes it a useful starting point for summarizing total-period poverty. It has been used 
among others by Baulch and Hoddinot (2000), when counting poverty spells and its 
distribution across a population. 
  
Measure (7) is probably the most straightforward and relevant for empirical analysis. 
It aggregates individual period-by-period poverty spells into one aggregate measure of 
poverty over a period of time consisting of T spells. It is also close to the ideas behind 
Foster (2007) in this collection, with one crucial differences: we do not restrict this   17
measure to be zero for those who experience a frequency of spells below the ￿chronic 
poverty￿ threshold.  
   
Case 2: Focus-Aggregation-Transformation (FAT) 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () T T T T y f y f y f A g y y y P , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 K K ≡    (9)  
 
A different set of families obtains if aggregation occurs before a convex 
transformation is enforced. Since focus retains the first move, it is still true that 
poverty episodes remain the crucial concern. We do not take into account any 
outcomes above the poverty line: there is no weight attached to being better off in 
good years. For example, Figures 1a and 1b will still be equally valued and period-
long poverty will still be the same for both cases. However, in (9), the severity of 
poverty is paid attention to not in every single spell, but only after all spell-specific 
outcomes are summarised into one single value. It is overall severity that matters. 
 
Take the following few example, which can read as a transformation of some form of 



















y , , y , y P
1 2 1 1 K , with 1<α and 0<β. (10) 
 
Given the sequencing of the three stages, it is clear that Monotonicity still holds, 
unlike  Sub-period decomposability and Full-period repetitions, which must be 
weakened down to Sub-period consistency. Finally, Increasing cost of hardship also 
fails to hold, which may be undesirable on a number of accounts ￿ very bad poverty 
spells are brushed aside as long as on average, poverty spells are not too severe. This 
result, which clearly follows from the location of transformation at the final position 
of the sequence, may explain why no instances of this specification can be found in 
the literature. Nonetheless, other cases where transformation also comes last do exist 
in the literature, as we see next. 
 
Case 3: Aggregation-Focus-Transformation (AFT)   18
 
  () () () () T T T T y y y A f g y y y P , , , , , , 2 1 2 1 K K ≡  (11) 
 
Here, transformation remains last, and even more importantly, focus is removed from 
the first position. Note that this second choice implies that some degree of 
compensation does occur across spells. As opposed to the view underlying FTA and 
FAT, what matters here is not so much whether the individual faced severe hardship 
at any particular point in time (regardless of how she performs at other points). The 
main concern is rather that outcomes realised in the rest of the period may not be high 
enough to compensate for observed hardship episodes. In other words, poverty does 
not imply an irremediable loss, since the case is also possible, where hardship does 
occur, but high consumption in other spells do ￿save￿ the period. Looking back at our 
illustrative examples, Figure 1a has more poverty than Figure 1b. 
 
Put it differently, (11) would be consistent with poverty assessed in relation to some 
form of intertemporal utility-based measure of poverty, whereby, given instantaneous 
or direct utility in a particular spell, the present value of these utilities is calculated as 
the sum of discounted direct utility, to which then some benchmark norm is applied. 
While this is open to argument, it does make somewhat unsatisfactory reading since 
period-long poverty can be reduced by focusing on spells of already high 
consumption well above the poverty line, say in the form of temporary opulence and 
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2 1 1 1 K , with 0<α<1 and 0<β. (13) 
 
Since transformation comes last, Increasing cost of hardship fails to hold. More 
strikingly, also Sub-period consistency does (which of course rules out Sub-period 
decomposability as well). To see why, take the following example. Imagine outcomes 
in a four-spell period changes from (8,8,8,40) to (4,4,8,40), with z=10. Poverty has   19
risen in the sub-period comprising the first two spells (while the rest of the period is 
unaltered), and yet poverty for the entire poverty remains at zero. Again, the reason 
must be found in the fact that compensations across spells are possible. 
 
This may therefore seem an unappealing measure. However, one of the most 
commonly used ￿measures of chronic poverty￿, based on Jalan and Ravallion (2000), 
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2 1 1 1 K , which is an FGT measure of poverty 
applied to mean consumption in the period. It rests strongly on the case for 
compensations across periods. 
 
Case 4: Transformation-Aggregation-Focus (TAF) 
 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) () () T T T T y g , , y g , y g A f y , , y , y P K K 2 1 2 1 ≡  (14) 
 
Again, removing focus from the first position does matter, since compensations are 
allowed. For instance in the following examples, the main comparison takes place 
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1 2 1 1 0
α
β K , with 0<α<1 and 0<β (16) 
   
Note that in fact, these specifications may allow PT=0 even if yt<z for some t ￿ this 
may well be the case if yt is sufficiently above z in some other spells. 
 
In terms of our desiderata, Increasing cost of hardship applies (since transformation is 
enforced before aggregation), but again, Sub-period consistency is dropped, along 
with  Sub-period decomposability. In addition, Monotonicity is risked, since cases   20
where yt>z will display the troublesome feature of greater positive gaps between yt and 
z raising both spell-specific and period-long poverty. Unsurprinsingly, no instance of 
this specification exists in the literature. 
 
The result of this discussion is that a number of choices can be made in terms of the 
sequence of aggregation, transformation and the application of a focus criterion, but 
only a relatively limited set is consistent with some desiderata. For example, (7) and 
(8) or (12) and (13), building on the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke and Chakravarty 
families of measure have been taken as acceptable candidates. A key issue is the 
extent of compensation between spells that is allowed ￿ a normative choice we can 
only point to. However, the discussion opens avenues for applications and extensions. 
In the next few sections, we will address three further issues: first, whether there is 
any primacy of particular spells in our assessment of period-long poverty. For 
example, should the last state be given any special weight, as the end-point of our 
assessment? The second issue is whether there are any normative issues related to the 
particular sequencing of spells ￿ in particular, should any additional attention be paid 
to repeated spells and therefore prolonged periods of poverty? Finally, what would 
happen if we move to forward-looking measures, that take into account that the world 
is uncertain? 
 
5. Equally-valued spells 
 
In all the examples thus far we have not been explicit about the choice of the 
parameter β beyond requiring that it is positive. The coefficient β determines the rate 
of time discounting: the weight we attach to consumption and poverty spells in 
different periods. Standard economic analysis assesses the value of some future flow 
of a variable of interest (such as income or consumption) by assuming the rate of time 
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α
β K , as seen from the outset at t=1, we would 
require β>1, so that outcomes in the distant future receive less attention. However, in 
our assessment of poverty spells, we argue that in fact, the choice is not as self-  21
evident. For example taking β=1, meaning not to exert any discount, or even β<1, may  
be a sensible decision, given our purposes.  
 
While time-discounting is made undisputed use of in most intertemporal economic 
problems, it is not self-evident that it should apply when assessing hardship spells. 
Severe hardship must cause some irremediable impact on human life, or at least this 
seems to be the spirit underlying the whole of the literature on poverty. Poverty 
episodes are spells of misfortune which cannot be compensated for (in the spirit of 
FTA). Note how close this argument comes to the rationale behind the cases above, 
where focus is given the first priority, as opposed to those where the focus applies 
after some aggregation has been performed and outcomes are allowed to compensate 
for one another across spells, such as in the case of AFT. Even if some compensation 
were allowed for, it would seem reasonable to require that compensation comes at 
least at some serious cost. In any case, allowing some compensation is not an 
argument to dismiss poverty spells, simply because they occur far away in the future. 
In other words, discounting spells would sit uncomfortable with a concept of period-
long poverty. 
 
There is a corollary in the literature on health measures. In the context of the 
measurement of health, Anand and Hanson (1994) refuse to accept time discounts in 
the calculation of DALYs: ￿We can see no justification for an estimation of the time 
lost to illness or death which depends on when the illness or the calculation occurs. 
Suppose a person experiences an illness today and another person, identical in all 
respects, experiences an illness of exactly the same description next year. Discounting 
amounts to concluding that the quantity of the (same) illness is lower in the latter 
case. This does not accord with intuition or even with common use of language￿. We 
are inclined to agree with this view. ￿A principle of universalism would argue 
strongly for a common intrinsic valuation of human life, regardless of the age at (or 
the time period in) which it is lived￿.  
 
An axiomatic formulation for this stance (β=1) allows reshuffles across time-positions 
to occur with no bearing on total, period-long poverty. Timing does not matter. Thus, 
we could impose 
   22
Symmetry over time-positions 
 
PT(y1,y2,￿,yT) = PT(yσ(1),yσ(2),￿,yσ(T)), (17) 
 
where σ(u) is a one-to-one function whose co-domain is identical to its domain 
(1,2,￿,T). 
 
All the measures described before could be trivially adjusted to allow for (17) by 
setting β=1. 
 
But other arguments could be made. In evaluating trajectories, one may well be 
tempted to value more the spells at the end of period rather those at the beginning. 
Gradually drifting into poverty is then viewed as worse than evolving from spells in 
poverty out of poverty, even if the number and extent of spells in poverty may be 
equal in both cases. ￿All is well that ends well￿ may be sentiment that could be 
reflected in our value judgements. An example could be Figure 1d, compared to the 
reverse of this graph whereby the three ￿non-poor￿ spells come at the end: the latter 
would then be considered better. One way of introducing this in our evaluation of 
trajectories would be to consider β<1: spells later on are given a higher weight. Other 
choices are also possible: β could become period-dependent and particular periods in 
the future could be given a much higher weight.
2   
 
6. Axioms of a sequence-sensitive specification 
 
An arguably strong assumption is that some form of linearity is always present in our 
measures of period-long poverty. To be more precise, note that our aggregation 









. This linearity is at 
the basis of the fact that the valuation of a poverty spell is unrelated to its history, 
such as whether the person was poor before or not. This is ensured by the linearity-
related axioms above, but it can also be summarised by an underlying axiom ensuring 
                                                 
2 This sentiment is not unknown in the policy discourse, where targets are set: the Millenium 
Development Goals have a well-defined deadline, 2015, and this deadline is seemingly far more 
important than, say, outcomes in the preceding years.     23
 
Independence of other time-spells 
 
  PT(y1,￿ yK-1,y′K, yK+1,￿,yT) ￿ PT(y1,￿ yK-1,yK, yK+1,￿,yT) 
 =  PT(y′1,￿ y′K-1,y′K, y′K+1,￿,y′T) ￿ PT(y′1,￿ y′K-1,yK, y′K+1,￿,y′T) (18) 
 
However, the case against such independence exists. Indeed, one may prefer to 
imagine that prolonged, uninterrupted poverty is less acceptable than a situation of 
equally-frequent, but intermittent poverty episodes. For instance, within a T=3 period, 
two poverty episodes in a row may be harder to bear than the same two poverty 
episodes with a recovery-spell in between. 
 
Of course, this is a normative issue. It may also be phrased on the grounds of 
technology-related mechanisms, which we may even provide with the support of 
some empirical evidence ￿ e.g. body strength is progressively undermined by 
continuous hardship and makes further poverty harder to bear, or more plainly, low 
consumption comes hand in hand with asset depletion. However, we prefer to say that 
prolonged poverty can be particularly bad per se.
3 The quality of a human life may be 
eroded more harshly if poverty is sustained for a lengthy string of spells. 
 




  PT(y1,y2,￿,yK-1,yK+d,￿,yT) ￿ PT(y1,y2,￿,yK-1,yK,￿,yT) ≤ (19) 
PT(y1,y2,￿,yK-1+e,yK+d,￿,yT) ￿ PT(y1,y2,￿,yK-1+e,yK,￿,yT), for d,e≥0. 
 
This axiom implies that some form of path dependence exists. A change in any given 
spell can only be assessed with knowledge of outcomes in previous spells. In 
particular, greater poverty in a spell implies that a drop in consumption in the 
                                                 
3 Another way of putting this is that we assume here that our underlying standard of living indicator 
comprehensively incorporates these concerns, so that there is no more information on the spell-specific 
standard of living required, for example on one￿s asset position, once the standard of living is known. 
Our concern with the sequence of poverty spells relates to assessing the sequence of spell-specific 
standard of living outcomes: repeated spells have an additional welfare cost and there is information in 
the sequencing of spells.   24
following spell will hit harder. Our specification in (19), however, can only be taken 
as a starting point, since it narrows the concept of prolonged poverty down to a 
dependence only on the immediately preceding spell, whereas one may just as well 
allow spells further back to matter likewise. 
 
Note that this concern with prolonged poverty is not just one more form of smoothing 
behaviour. In fact, it may actually run against such behaviour. For instance, in the face 
of three consecutive spells where the consumption level remains invariant and below 
the poverty line, PT(y1,y2,￿,yT) may drop if the neat, smooth sequence is broken by 
raising the middle consumption level above the poverty line, at the expense of a 
decrease in the other two spells. In other words, individual preferences may or may 
not favour smoothing efforts, and yet sensitivity of PT(y1,y2,￿,yT) to prolonged 
poverty persists all the same. Our measure has a normative role, consisting in no more 
than reporting the extent of poverty-related suffering over a stretch of time, quite 
regardless of the features of the objective function of the individual. 
 
For instance, take the following specification: 
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1 1 2 1 β K , with 0<β (20) 
 
and where some standard value for ỹ0 could be added as a convention to prevent 
h(ỹt,ỹt-1) from being undefined for t=1. One particular specification for this sequence-
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α ρ
β K , with 1<α, 0<β and 1<ρ<0   (21) 
 
The measure in (21) can be seen as one example of a FTA measure: first focus is 
applied, then a transformation takes place and finally, aggregation over spells. This 
last stage includes however a new element, as it allows the preceding spell to act as a 
weight. In particular, note that quite naturally a poverty-free spell (ỹt=z) does not add 
to period-long poverty, neither in the same spell nor in the following one. However, if 
poverty does hit the individual, then the resulting burden increases in the severity of   25
hardship in the recent past (since ρ>0). And likewise, this new poverty episode 
impinges on the weight of future deprivation. The restriction ρ>1 simply aims to rule 
out the case where in the assessment of hardship at time t, the poverty gap at t￿1 
receives more attention than the actual gap at t. 
 
Note that this specification imposes that ỹt and ỹt-1 must be seen as complements as we 
assess the contribution of poor consumption in spell t to total, period-long poverty PT.  
In other words, whenever we assess the extent of consumption shortfall in a particular 
spell, our valuation includes the memory of the shortfall if any in the last period. 
There is a close similarity to the literature on multidimensional poverty, where 
different attritibutes are assessed in relation to each other. Just as in multidimensional 
assessment, the fact that consumption (shortfalls) in any two spells must be combined 
into one composite leaves the gate open to questions on whether they complement (or 
substitute for) each other. In our case, complementarity is the only intuitive answer,  
since it is the fear that poor previous consumption may compound current hardship 
what motivates the Prolonged poverty axiom. The measure in (21) ￿ one of many 
possibilities ￿ allows for this complementarity, ensuring that poverty spells are valued 
higher in overall period poverty if they follow after another poverty spell. 
 
7. Vulnerabilility in a dynamic world 
 
The entire discussion thus far has considered poverty in a world with time, but with 
no risk. When constructing a measure of poverty over time ex-post, building on past 
observed outcomes in the standard of living, then this may be acceptable. Such a 
measure values actual realizations of a trajectory of the standard of living. However, 
using the earlier analysis when looking forward into the future to assess different 
paths of the standard of living, we implicitly assume perfect foresight: we know the 
realization of the standard of living without any uncertainty. In itself, such exercises 
are useful: for example, to compare trajectories under different policies or 
interventions. But one striking feature of such assessment is that it is unlikely to be 
done in a world of certainty, and risk should feature. 
   26
In Calvo and Dercon (2006), a measure of vulnerability as the ￿threat of poverty￿ has 
been derived. In particular, a set of desiderata has been proposed, borrowing from the 
standard poverty literature, and incorporating axioms that capture desirable properties 
stemming from the need to aggregate over states of the world. In the annex, an extract 
of this paper is given. The intuition is to provide an aggregate over some 
transformation of outcomes in all states of the world, whereby outcomes in each state 
are assessed relative to the poverty line. This gives a metric of the threat of poverty, 
before uncertainty has been resolved, and not of poverty itself. As appendix 1 shows, 
the desiderata include a focus axiom, symmetry over states, continuity and 
differentiability, scale invariance, normalisation, probability-dependent effect of 
outcomes, a probability-transfer axiom between states, and risk sensitivity (so 
increased risk raises vulnerability). If we impose an assumption of constant relative 
risk sensitivity, then it is shown that the preferred vulnerability measure will be the 














1 ) ( , with 0<α<1. (22) 
E is the expected value operator, and α regulates the strength of risk sensitivity ￿ as α 
rises to 1, we approach risk-neutrality. It is crucial to note that as defined by (22), 
vulnerability becomes greater whenever uncertainty rises, even if all in all expected 
outcomes remain unaltered. Thus, a normative choice is made to ensure that risk per 
se is bad and compounds expected hardship. 
 
Note also that ỹt is a vector consisting of ỹit, censored outcomes for each state of the 
world i at time t. Although forward-looking, this measure is still essentially timeless: 
possible outcomes in timeless states are considered before the veil of uncertainty is 
lifted and before a particular state has been realized. Nevertheless, its desirable 
properties when constructing a measure of the threat of poverty mean that it could be 
used as a candidate for period-by-period outcomes before aggregation in an 
intertemporal measure of poverty. In particular, consider a amended version of (8), 
which in itself was based on the Chakravarty measure of poverty: 
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This can be considered a forward-looking and dynamic measure of vulnerability, 
consistent with a form of ￿FTAA￿-case, where allowing for uncertainty requires that 
the final stage (after focus in each state and transformation) is extended to a double 
exercise: aggregation first takes place over all states of the world in each t, and then it 
operates over all periods of time. In each period, it satisfies a set desiderata that 
appear reasonable when assessing poverty ex-ante in risky world, as a metric of the 
threat of poverty. Even if the presence of risk will affect the exact formulation of the 
intertemporal desiderata, it appears clear that versions of the intertemporal axioms 
related to Monotonicity, Increasing cost of transfers, and Sub-period decomposability 
apply as well. 
 
In other words, we have a measure of forward-looking intertemporal poverty, as a 
measure of the extent of the threat of poverty in the future, providing a clear ordering 
of different possible trajectories for individuals. It comes closer than any of its 
predecessors to providing a direct measure of ￿chronic￿ poverty, in that it does not just 
assesses poverty in one period, nor assesses poverty in a risk-free world. It offers an 
exact way of ordering very different and complex trajectories, including the threat of 
poverty and deprivation implied ex-ante for those whose trajectory in expectation 
contains serious spells of severe deprivation, even if ex-post they do not always 
become realized.  
 
8. An example from Ethiopia 
 
To illustrate the insights that can be gained from a variety of measures of 
intertemporal poverty, we use data from rural Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Rural 
Household Survey has collected data on about 1450 households over the course of 10 
years, in the form of six unequally spaced rounds. Here we drop round, which was 
collected in the second half of 2004, as it was collected in a distinctly different season 
and only about 6 months after the first round of 2004. The result is data from 1994, 
1995, 1997, 1999 and 2004. We use data on consumption per capita, deflated to be   28
expressed in 1994 prices. The consumption aggregate is based on careful recording of 
consumption from own production, purchased items and gifts, and is predominantly 
food, at about 75 percent reflecting the relative poverty of households in rural 
Ethiopia. The data is relatively highly clustered, from only 15 communities, but 
reasonably well spread across the country. Round-by-round attrition was low, 
although we focus in the rest of the analysis on 1187 observations with complete 
information in all rounds. More details can be found in  Dercon and Krishnan (2000).  
Using a poverty line not dissimilar from the national poverty line, at about 8.50 US 
dollars birr per capita per month, we find that the head count of poverty declined in 
this period, from 48 percent in 1994 and even 55 percent in 1995, to 33 percent by 
1997 (an exceptionally good harvest year) and 36 and 35 percent in respectively 1999 
and 2004. Still, there is considerable churning, and combined with the gradual 
decreasing poverty levels and possibly some problems of measurement error, we find 
that that only 18 percent of the households were never poor and 7 percent were poor 
in all rounds. 
 





Never Poor  18 
Poor once  22 
Poor in 2 out of 5 rounds  23 
Poor in 3 out of 5 rounds  16 
Poor in 4 out of 5 rounds  14 
Poor in all rounds  7 
Source: Ethiopia Rural Household Survey (based on 1187 observation with data in all 
5 rounds).  
 
Using these data, we calculated a number of different poverty measures summarizing 
these poverty experiences, using 1187 observations .  First, and for comparison we 
calculated the squared poverty gap (the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure with α=2) in 
the base year, 1994 and the final year, 2004. We find that it almost halved from 0.120 
to about 0.065. In terms of intertemporal measures, we calculated measure (7) with 
α=2, an FGT-style measure in which the focus axiom is applied before transformation 
and aggregation, so that no compensation is allowed between periods. We also use the 
assumption of equal-valued spells, i.e. β=1. Although measure (7) is not scaled by the   29
number of periods, dividing it by 5 gives a direct way to compare it with the period-
by-period squared poverty gaps. Its scaled mean value is 0.089 is consistent with the 
nature of the decline in poverty in this period. Next, we calculated measure (12), 
effectively the Jalan and Ravallion (2000) measure, a squared poverty gap measure 
based on mean consumption in this period, allowing for compensation and equal-
valued spells (with α=2 and β=1). Its mean value of 0.025 suggests how strong the 
impact is of allowing for compensation, i.e. for aggregation before the focus axiom is 
applied. Further, we calculated two indexes of poverty, based on (7) but relax the 
assumption of equal-valued spells, by focusing on an index that values more recent 
years less than the past (β=0.85) and an index that values the present more than the 
past (β=1.15). Finally, we introduced sequence-sensitivity, using measure (22), which 
values poverty gaps only to the extent that one was poor in the previous year, using 
ρ=0.90, nesting it with the other cases by choosing α=2 and β=1. The actual values of 
these last three indexes cannot quite be compared with the other indexes shown. 
 
For empirical relevance, we need to ask whether these different measures of poverty 
tell us any different messages about poverty. As these measures are different non-
linear transformations of underlying consumption measures, a first appropriate way to 
compare these measures would be to look at rank correlations: do they order people 
differently? Table 2 gives Spearman correlation coefficients for all these measures. 
 

























Sq Pov Gap 1994 (α= 2 )   1         
Sq Pov gap 2004 (α=2)  0.166  1       
FTA (7), (β=1, α=2)  0.690  0.462  1      
AFT (12) (β=1, α=2)  0.553 0.468 0.689  1       
Seq FTA (22) (β=1, α=2, ρ=0.90)  0.662 0.371 0.824 0.715  1     
FTA (7), (β=0.85, α=2)  0.751 0.404 0.993 0.678 0.821  1   
FTA (7), (β=1.15, α=2)  0.633 0.516 0.994 0.690 0.813 0.974  1 
Source: calculated from the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey by authors. 
 
As could be expected, all measures are positively (significantly) correlated, but some 
interesting differences emerge. Poverty in 1994 and in 2004 is relatively weakly 
correlated, partly reflecting the overall decline. Among the intertemporal measures,   30
using the FTA (7) measure with different discount rates does not appear to matter 
αβmuch for the ranking of households, with high correlations with each other. 
Choices on the sequence of focus, transformation and aggregation appears to matter 
most, with a correlation of about 0.69 between the AFT (12) and the FTA (7) 
measures with otherwise equal values for α and β. Adjusting for the sequence of 
poverty outcomes matters, but the correlation remains high with the other AFT 
measures. At least in these data, choices on allowing for compensation appear to most 
important, while cross-section poverty estimates for a population may give the wrong 
impression on intertemporal poverty outcomes and rankings. 
 
Of course, much of this difference may be due to a different treatment of 
measurement error in welfare outcomes, entailed by each of these intertemporal 
poverty measures. More in general, the differences in poverty may be due to 
individual specific attributes hardly observable to researcher. One way of assessing 
whether our interpretation on the nature of poverty is different across measures is by 
constructing a ￿poverty profile￿, a multivariate description of the correlates of poverty 
in these data, effectively are whether we identify different types of households to be 
poor using these different measures. This definitely not an exploration of a causal 
relationship between any of the factors identified and poverty ￿ more careful analysis 
would be required ￿ but it can give some sense of whether different concepts of 
intertemporal poverty result in different implications, for example, when trying to 
target poor population on the basis of generic characteristics. Table 3 gives the 
correlates of some of the different poverty measures used in table 2: the poverty gap 
in 1994, the FTA (7), the AFT (12) and the sequential FTA. The last two FTA 
measures, with different discount rate, were not used as they are very highly 
correlated with the FTA (7). As the poverty measures used are all censored, we use a 
tobit model with censoring at zero. Table 3 reports the coefficients.  
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Table 3 Correlates of Poverty Measures (Tobit model) 
 
Poverty  
Gap 1994  AFT (7)  FTA (12) 
Seq AFT 
(7) 
head at least primary ed.  -0.094  -0.054  -0.088  -0.025 
  [2.35]**  [4.66]*** [3.36]*** [3.56]*** 
head some primary  -0.075  -0.02  -0.013  -0.006 
 [2.68]***  [2.39]**  [0.77]  [1.29] 
ln land per capita (ha)  -0.046  -0.019  -0.03  -0.008 
  [3.48]***  [4.89]*** [3.64]*** [3.42]*** 
sex of the head is male  -0.068  -0.007  0.001  -0.005 
  [2.49]** [0.83] [0.04] [0.97] 
no of female adults  0.029  0.01  0.013  0.006 
 [3.13]***  [3.32]***  [2.24]**  [3.95]*** 
no of girls 5-15  0.026  0.005  0.008  0.004 
 [2.69]***  [1.84]*  [1.37]  [2.61]*** 
no of girls 0-5  0.031  0.021  0.041  0.011 
  [2.18]**  [4.83]*** [4.74]*** [4.42]*** 
no of females 65+  0.037  0.004  -0.011  0.009 
  [1.17]  [0.46] [0.50] [1.59] 
no of male adults  0.015  0  -0.007  0.001 
  [1.61]  [0.12] [1.11] [0.63] 
no of boys 5-15  0.039  0.014  0.02  0.006 
  [4.14]***  [4.85]*** [3.40]*** [3.67]*** 
no of boys 0-5  0.056  0.022  0.038  0.011 
  [3.80]***  [4.88]*** [4.26]*** [4.45]*** 
no of males 65+  -0.047  -0.006  -0.024  -0.008 
  [0.96]  [0.43] [0.76] [0.93] 
distance to town (km)  0.021  0.006  0.013  0.004 
 [10.60]***  [10.43]***  [9.04]***  [10.84]*** 
coeff.  variation  rainfall  0.006  0.002 0.003 0.001 
  [5.69]***  [4.82]*** [3.86]*** [3.45]*** 
is road accessible trucks  -0.22  -0.072  -0.164  -0.04 
  [7.56]***  [8.66]*** [7.42]*** [7.75]*** 
village mean land p.c.  0.228  0.051  0.066  0.026 
  [7.48]***  [5.64]*** [3.55]*** [5.03]*** 
village mean male adults  -0.049  -0.039  0.052  -0.024 
 [0.71]  [1.87]*  [1.17]  [1.98]** 
village mean fem adults  0.397  0.188  0.178  0.095 
  [6.29]***  [9.93]*** [4.58]*** [8.79]*** 
Constant  -0.619  -0.212 -0.597 -0.152 
 [7.90]***  [9.14]***  [10.33]***  [10.99]*** 
Observations  1125  1125 1125 1125 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 
The correlates used include educational characteristics of the head (whether 
completed primary education or more, and whether some primary education, with the 
base group no education), land holding in hectares and per capita, the sex of the head, 
demographic composition of the household (number of male and female adults, 
children and elderly), and a number of village characteristics: the distance to the   32
nearest town in kilometers, whether there is a road passing the village that is 
accessible to trucks, buses and cars, and the coefficient of variation of rainfall in the 
village and finally, a few mean village characteristics, such as the mean land holding 
per capita, and the mean number of female and male adults per household (as there 
are substantial differences in land holdings and in demographic composition across 
villages).  
 
The most striking insight from the table is that the differences between the different 
intertemporal measures of poverty appears relatively small: in any case, in terms of 
significance, the same variables appear to stand out, with the expected signs: 
education, land, distance to towns, road access and weather variability. Demographic 
characteristics also matter but not the sex of the head. Strikingly, even the profile 
based on the 1994 squared poverty gap offers broadly a similar set of correlates. 
Obviously, this does not mean that the same people are being predicted as being poor 
across equations.  
 
It is difficult to interpret the differences in the size of the coefficients across 
equations, as the left hand side variables are rather different and most are not directly 
comparable. To highlight better the different interpretations across the regressions, we 
can compare the marginal effects relative to the mean of each left hand size variable. 
In other words, we can establish the percentage change on each poverty measure from 
a change in one of the explanatory variables. The relevant marginal effects are not the 
coefficients given in table 3 as the zeros in the data can be given direct meaning (a 
zero squared poverty gap is a zero squared poverty gap, and not some unobserved 
negative poverty). The coefficients in table 3 give the marginal effects relative to the 
underlying latent variable of the statistical model which is assumed to take on   
negative values. Instead, we use marginal effects based on the unconditional expected 
value, evaluated at the mean of all explanatory variables.  Expressing these as a 
percentage of the mean dependent variable for each poverty measure, we obtain table 
4.    33
Table 4 Percentage change in Poverty Index from Marginal Change in Characteristics 
  
  AFT (7)  FTA (12)  Seq AFT (7)   
From no education to primary completed  -0.43  -0.39  -0.48     
Doubling land per capita  -0.17  -0.19  -0.18     
Reducing distance to town by one kilometer  -0.05  -0.08  -0.09     
From bad or no road to road accessible for 
trucks/bus -0.63  -1.01  -0.91     
Source: calculated from results in table 3 
 
These results are suggestive, as there are some interesting differences in the order of 
magnitudes of the relative marginal effects. The most striking differences relate to the 
infrastructure variables: using the FTA (12) measure (i.e. allowing for compensation 
over time) suggests that living nearer to towns or with better roads is associated with 
considerably lower poverty than implied by the AFT (7). Education improvements are 
more strongly related to the AFT measures, especially the measure that effectively 
only counts repeated poverty episodes. In short, when using poverty measures over 
time, the way aggregation over time is done will affect the characteristics that will be 





This paper has offered a discussion of a number of issues related to measuring poverty 
over time. It has highlighted some of the key normative decisions that have to be 
taken. In particular, we have highlighted the role of compensation over time (whether 
poverty spells can be compensated for by non-poverty spells); the issue of the 
discount rate (whether each spell should be given an equal weight); and the issue of 
the role of persistence (whether repeated spells should be given a higher weight). We 
have offered a number of plausible poverty measures, each with different assumptions 
regarding these key issues. We have also shown how these insights can be used to 
construct a forward looking measure of vulnerability. Applying a number of these 
measures to data from rural Ethiopia, it is shown that while correlations are high, 
there would still be considerable differences in ranking households by poverty 
                                                 
4 As is well known with poverty profiles, these results have only limited policy implications, as these 
correlates are not shown to be causal factors, and even if they were, the relative cost of intervening in 
terms of infrastructure, land or education would have to be taken into account.   34
according to different measures, especially those that have different views on the role 
of compensation. Turning to a multivariate poverty profile, it was shown that while 
similar factors are significant, their relative importance in identifying intertemporal 
poverty is different according to the measure used to summarize poverty.  
 
Appendix 1  
A family of individual vulnerability measures (based on Calvo and 
Dercon (2006)) 
 
Let individual vulnerability (V) be measured by V=v(z,p,y), where z is the poverty 
line, and p and y are k-dimensional vectors, containing state-of-the-world 
probabilities and outcomes, respectively ￿ i.e., pi is the probability of the i-th state 
occurring, with outcome yi. We impose yi≥0. It may be easiest to think of these 
outcomes as consumption levels in each possible state of the world, especially if 
poverty is defined as usual as a shortfall in consumption. We remark that we mean 
outcomes  after all consumption-smoothing efforts have been deployed. In other 
words, their variability across states is taken as a final word, with no scope for 
reducing it further, e.g. by formal insurance, risk-sharing, or precautionary savings. 
 
For each state, define ￿censored outcome￿ ỹi by ỹi≡Min(yi,z), and the ￿rate of coverage 
of basic needs￿ xi by xi≡ỹi/z, so that 0≤xi≤1. Vectors ỹ and x are defined 
correspondingly. ei stands for a k-dimensional vector whose elements are 0, except for 
the i-th one, which equals 1. We close our notation with vectors ŷ and ỹ
c. Their 
elements are all equal to ŷ and ỹ
c, respectively, which in turn are defined by 
ŷ=∑ =
k
i i iy ~ p
1  and v(z,p,ỹ)=v(z,p,ỹ
c). Note that ỹ
c can be written as a function ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ) 
and will shortly be called the risk-free equivalent to the set of prospects described by 
(z,p,y), in the sense that it yields the same degree of vulnerability. ŷ is the expected 
value of ỹi. 
 
We propose eight desiderata. The first is the FOCUS  AXIOM, which imposes 
v(z,p,y)=v(z,p,ỹ). Our measure will thus disregard outcome changes above the poverty 
line. If vulnerability is understood as a burden caused by the threat of future poverty, 
it should not be compensated by simultaneous (ex-ante) possibilities of being well-off. 
In consequence, high vulnerability is not necessarily tantamount for grim overall 
expected wellbeing (as arguably in Ligon and Schechter), since the ￿promise￿ of 
richness in some states can raise welfare expectations, with no bearing on 
vulnerability. 
 
Imagine that a farmer faces two scenarios: rain (no poverty) or drought (poverty). 
Does she become less vulnerable if the harvest in the rainy scenario improves? Our 
answer is ￿no￿. Poverty is as bad a threat as before. It is as likely as before, and it is 
potentially as severe as before. 
 
According to this axiom, ￿excess￿ outcomes yi￿z>0 are ￿wasteful￿ and can be ignored, 
as far as vulnerability is concerned. Taking this for granted, the remaining axioms can 
be presented as follows:   35
 
SYMMETRY OVER STATES:  v(z,p,ỹ)=v(z,Bp,Bỹ), where B is any k￿k permutation 
matrix. All states receive the same treatment, and the only relevant difference between 
two states of the world i and j is the difference in their outcomes (yi,  yj) and 
probabilities (pi, pj). 
 
CONTINUITY AND DIFFERENTIABILITY. Function v(z,p,ỹ) is continuous and twice-
differentiable in y, for tractability and to preclude abrupt reactions to small changes in 
outcomes. 
 
SCALE INVARIANCE. v(z,p,ỹ)=v(λz,p,λỹ) for any λ>0. Our measure will not depend on 
the unit of measure of outcomes. 
 
NORMALISATION. Minỹ[v(z,p,ỹ)]=0 and Maxỹ[v(z,p,ỹ)]=1. We impose closed 
boundaries to facilitate interpretation and comparability. 
 
PROBABILITY-DEPENDENT EFFECT OF OUTCOMES. For ￿c<ỹi<z and pip′i≠0, 
v(z,p,ỹ)￿v(z,p,ỹ+cei)=v(z,p′,ỹ′)￿v(z,p′,ỹ′+cei) if and only if pi=p′i and ỹi=ỹ′i. Should ỹi 
change, the consequent effect on vulnerability is not allowed to depend on the 
outcomes or probabilities of other states of the world ￿ for a given pi, the change in 
vulnerability depends only on ỹi.
5 In the opposite direction, the effect must be 
sensitive to the likelihood of that particular state of the world. Note that pip′i≠0 
discards ￿impossible￿ states (pi=p′i=0). 



















ỹi is greater than or at least equal to ỹj, then vulnerability cannot increase as a result of 
a probability transfer from state j to state i. Likewise, if ỹi is lower than or at most 
equal to ỹj, then vulnerability cannot decrease. Going back to the example of the 
farmer facing rain and drought, we say that she becomes more vulnerable if a drought 
becomes more likely, at the expense of the rainy scenario (or at least, her vulnerability 
does not lessen as a result). 
 
RISK SENSITIVITY.  v(z,p,ỹ)>v(z,p,ŷ). Vulnerability would be lower if the expected 
(censored) outcome ŷ were attained in all states of the world and uncertainty were 
thus removed. In other words, greater risk raises vulnerability.
6 Thus we link up with 
our first intuition about vulnerability, as a concept aiming to capture the burden of 
insecurity, the fact that hardship is also related to fear of future threats.  
 
Alternatively, resorting to the risk-free equivalent ỹ
c, the same axiom could be 
expressed as ỹ
c/ŷ<1. Expected outcome is unevenly and ￿inefficiently￿ spread across 
states of the world, in the sense that a similarly low degree of vulnerability would 
result from ỹ
c<ŷ being secured in every state. ỹ
c/ŷ reflects this ￿efficiency loss￿. 
                                                 
5  A possible counterargument could run ￿in fact, there could be some relief in considering that one 
could have done much better had the odds been more fortunate￿ (or to the contrary, ￿she may rue 
having missed a better possible outcome, with no fault on her part, and thus her misery will be 
greater￿). We ignore such counterarguments for the sake of tractability. In doing so, we simply adhere 
to the common concept of poverty as mere failure to reach a poverty line, with no regard for 
￿subjective￿ subtleties. 
6  We implicitly define the increase in risk as a probability transfer ￿from the middle to the tails￿, in 
keeping with one of the Rothschild-Stiglitz senses of risk.   36
 
CONSTANT  RELATIVE  RISK  SENSITIVITY. For κ>0,  κỹ
c(z,p,ỹ)=ỹ
c(z,p,κỹ). A 
proportional increase by κ in the outcomes of all possible states of the world leads to a 
similar proportional increase in the risk-free equivalent ỹ
c. While risk sensitivity 
ensures ỹ
c/ŷ<1, we now require this ratio (or ￿efficiency loss￿) to remain constant if all 
state-specific outcomes increase proportionally. 
 
As compared to the previous axioms, this final property seems less compelling. Still, 
we find it attractive for its contribution both to narrowing down the families of 
acceptable measures to only one, and to securing that risk sensitivities receive an 
appropriate treatment. As for this second point, Ligon and Schechter (2003) were the 
first to point out that some existing vulnerability measures hid some awkward 
assumptions, e.g. risk sensitivity increasing in initial income, at odds with most 
empirical findings on risk attitudes (e.g. Binswanger 1981). 
 
Needless to say, we are avoiding here terms such as ￿risk aversion￿ or ￿utility￿. We 
intend our choice of language to convey our view of vulnerability as distinct from 
expected utility, if only to stress our departure from proposals where vulnerability 
boils down to some form of bad ￿overall￿ expectations (e.g. Ligon and Schechter). On 
the other hand, parallels should be obvious. In fact, the proof of the following theorem 
heavily draws on results from expected utility theory (mainly Pratt 1964), necessarily 
with some departures due to the specific traits of our vulnerability concept. For this 
reason and for brevity, it is not provided, but it is available on request. 
  
THEOREM  1 ￿ If all the axioms above are satisfied, then 
 
 V (α)=1￿E[x
α], with 0<α<1. (1) 
 
E is the expected value operator, and we recall xi≡ỹi/z is the rate of coverage of basic 
needs, and 0≤xi≤1. We highlight the simplicity of this single-parameter family of 
measures V(α).
7 Of course, α regulates the strength of risk sensitivity ￿ as α rises to 1, 
we approach risk-neutrality. 
 
A few remarks are in place. First, for those facing no uncertainty and with known 
xi=x
*<1 for all i, V(α)>0. If vulnerability is about the threat of poverty, certainty of 
being poor is but a dominant, irresistible threat. The concept is not confined to those 
whom the winds might blow into poverty or out from it. Vulnerability is about risk, 
but not only about it. 
 
Second, it is easy to prove that V(α) is equal to the probability of being poor only if 
outcomes are expected to be zero in every state of the world where the individual is 
poor. If vulnerability were measured as expected FGT0 (as in Chaudhuri et al. 2002), 
then vulnerability would be overestimated. Ligon and Schechter have pointed out the 
shortcomings of other FGT choices.
8 
 
                                                 
7  For instance, if our last axiom (constant relative risk sensitivity) were replaced by constant absolute 
risk sensitivity [κ+ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ)=ỹ
c(z,p,ỹ+κ), for κ>0], the less attractive measure V(β)=1￿E[{e
β(1￿x)￿1}/{e
β￿
1}], with β>0, would result. 
8  More precisely, we should speak about expected individual poverty, as measured by the function 
implicit in the corresponding aggregate FGT index, as in Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).   37
Finally,  V(α) can still be assimilated into the expected-poverty approach to 
vulnerability, provided poverty is measured as in Chakravarty (1983). In some sense, 
one of the contributions of this paper is to identify the Chakravarty poverty index as 
the best choice if the poverty analysis moves from static poverty on to vulnerability.   38
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